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THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF JUSTICE: 
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF HIGH COURT 
DECISION-MAKING IN ARGENTINA AND YENEZUELA
It is impossible to govern ifthe Supreme Court is against all o f the Executive’s political initiatives
and might declare all the laws implemetited by it unconstitutional. 
Raul Granillo Ocampo, a top official in the govemment of Carlos Menem,
offering an informal rationale 
for the govemment’s initiative to enlarge the Argentine Supreme Court1.
(The Venezuelan Supreme Court has) committed suicide in order not to be assassinated. 
Former Venezuelan Supreme Court Chief Justice Cecilia Sosa, upon resigning from the Court after
it ruled that designating a Commission of Judicial Emergency tasked
with reorganizing the judiciary 
did not exceed the powers of the Constituent Assembly .
Introduction
During the last two decades, social scientists have begun to examine the links 
between law and legał systems, and the broader political and economic changes 
that are transforming developing democracies. In comparative politics and public 
law debates on democracy, legał issues raised by national and transnational human 
rights movements, and the rule of law, have become prominent concems. With the 
spread of neoliberal economic reform and with new pressures from the world 
economy, property rights, commercial law, and the predictability of legał systems 
have become dominant themes in the work of legał scholars and students of politi­
cal economy. One primary goal of these evolving research agendas is to assess 
whether legał institutions are proving to be a catalyst, or an obstacle, to deepening 
democracy and economic innovation.
1 International Commission o f  Jurists 1990: 1, cited in H e lm k e  2000: 140.
2 As quoted in P ć r e z  P e rd o m o  2003c: 468.
Within this growing research program straddling law, political science, and 
economics, a central sub-set of scholarship focuses on judicial politics in developing 
democracies. A majority of these studies examine judicial independence or judicial 
decision-making, and a central fmding has been that high courts in many young 
democracies around the globe have begun to flex their muscles by ruling against the 
interests of power holders in politically and economically important cases. Nonethe- 
less, they are doing so selectively, a phenomenon that is both the result and the cause of 
the difficulty of establishing the rule of law in newly transitioned, or unstable polities. 
Cross-national, cross-issue, and over-time variation in the willingness of high courts in 
developing democracies to challenge power-holders raises a politically important and 
theoretically interesting question that has not been fully addressed in the literature: why 
do high courts in new democracies rule as they do on politically and economically 
significant casesl
This paper seeks to address that ąuestion. The paper presents a comparison of 
selected justice sector and judicial institutions -  referred to as the “infrastructure of 
justice” -  in Argentina and Venezuela from 1983 to 2003, and suggests how those 
institutions, and variation in them, might affect high court decision-making. Argentina 
and Venezuela make an interesting pair of cases in which to study high court decision- 
making for a number of reasons. First, Argentina and Venezuela initiated two of 
contemporary Latin America’s first and largest extemally funded judicial reform 
projects, and two of the region’s broadest institutional reform efforts (Ungar 2002: 10- 
11). Secondly, the two countries exhibit fascinating over-time and cross-issue variation 
in the degree to which their high courts challenge the central govemment. Finally, 
while both countries have been considered electoral democracies during the period 
under study, each has experienced moments of political uncertainty (and longer periods 
of what might be called “de-democratization”), as well as significant periods of econo­
mic upheaval, sińce 1983; importantly, in each country, the high court has been 
actively engaged in conflict resolution during such periods. Examining high court 
decision-making in politically and economically volatile contexts offers a unique 
opportunity to broaden our understanding of both the determinants of high court 
decision-making, and the contribution high courts can make to political and economic 
development in new or unstable democracies.
Extant theorizing and justification of an institutional approach
Much of the literature on judicial politics in developing democracies focuses directly 
on explaining judicial decision-making, and the recent extension of courts’ authority 
into the political realm, or what Tate and Vallinder (1995) cali the “judicialization of 
politics.” These arguments can be placed in three categories: cultural explanations, 
explanations that point to attributes of the judiciary as an institution, and those that 
portray judges as strategie actors.
Many scholars of Latin American judiciaries highlight cultural factors to 
explain the functioning of courts and, specifically, the lack of judicial activism in the
region. Karst and Rosenn (1975) are just two of many researchers who argue that 
judicial activism is impeded by the formalistic (or literalist) naturę of Latin American 
legał culture. According to Hilbink (1999) and Fruhling (1984), judicial reluctance to 
challenge legislation on constitutional grounds in Chile results from the traditional 
training of Chilean judges.
Other scholars emphasize attributes of the judicial or legał system in 
explaining why judges make the decisions they do. Some stress the importance of 
judicial legitimacy to judicial activism; in examining the Mexican case, for example, 
Staton (2002) found that the willingness of the Mexican Supreme Court to challenge 
the authority of elected officials was positively correlated with the Court’s public 
legitimacy. Others suggest that constitutional courts are more likely to exercise judicial 
control of the constitution than are supreme courts granted constitutional review 
powers (Ginsburg 2002). Still others make the argument that judicial activism results 
from the “demand” for a particular court: courts are increasingly likely to be activist the 
more societal organizations actively attempt to use litigation as a strategy for social 
change (Epp 1998). Others point to “supply,” suggesting that courts to which cases can 
arrive for decision more easily are more likely to be activist (Ginsberg 2002). The 
emphasis on judicial reform in much of the recent literature on Latin American courts 
(Hammergren 1998; Prillaman 2000; Ungar 2002) suggests a last hypothesis: courts 
are more likely to be activist when they have been assigned additional roles, 
jurisdictions, or funds, or been awarded expanded formal independence, through 
judicial reform.
The finał sub-set of studies paints judges as strategie actors whose rulings are 
guided by the opportunities and constraints in the political system within which they 
operate. Based on their study of the Russian Constitutional Court, Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova (2001) suggest that courts postpone activism if they anticipate it will 
generate legitimacy-robbing confrontation with, or non-compliance on the part of, 
executives or legislatures, in an effort to build legitimacy. Cooter and Ginsburg (1996) 
agree that courts grow more reluctant to issue rulings as the probability of non- 
compliance with those decisions, executive retaliation to them, or legislative repeal of 
them inereases. Other scholars point to party system determinants of strategie rulings. 
For instance, some hołd that courts are more activist in countries with inchoate party 
systems in which legislation is more difficult to pass and legislative repeal is less likely 
(Cooter and Ginsburg 1996; Rfos-Figueroa 2003). Still others propose that courts in 
countries with greater altemation of parties in power may be more independent, and 
thus more activist (Ramseyer, 1994). Helmke (2002), in a study of the Argentine 
Supreme Court (1977-1995), found that judges in uncertain institutional environments 
rule against a sitting govemment more often as it becomes increasingly weaker towards 
the end of its tenure, in an effort to gain the support of the incoming administration. 
Based on their analysis of the Argentine Supreme Court (1935-1998), Iaryczower et al. 
hołd that the probability that Argentine justices will vote against the constitutionality of 
a federal law or presidential decree rises with their degree of opposition to the sitting 
govemment, and falls with the degree of control the executive retains over the 
legislature (2000: 1).
This paper builds on the second approach: it analyzes the impact of certain 
structural and procedural aspects of justice sectors and judiciaries on high court 
decision-making in Latin America. As the above review suggests, there is a marked 
lack of detailed institutional analysis in the literature on Latin American judiciaries. 
While this might seem to represent a significant theoretical gap, scholars who study 
courts in the region have shied away from institutional analysis for good reason: they 
doubt that studying the “formal rules of the judicial game” will yield useful theories 
given the instability in judicial institutions in the region, and the vast gap that often 
exists between formal institutions and informal (but nonetheless “institutionalized”) 
practices ( 0 ’Donnell 1996, Helmke 2000: 21, 248). Theories that highlight the 
importance of institutional features cannot completely explain judicial decision-making 
in Latin America. However, that insufficiency does not make studying institutions 
unimportant.
I offer four justifications for institutional analysis. First, judicial institutions 
represent a crucial baseline; examining them allows us to assess the degree to which 
actual practice diverges from the behavior that would result if formal rules and 
institutions were respected. Second, while the correspondence between institutionally- 
mandated behavior and actual practice may not be perfect, there is almost certainly 
a positive correlation: while institutions do not determine behavior (anywhere), even in 
Latin America they make certain behaviors more probable than others.
Third, from a methodological point of view, the empirical variation that 
characterizes judicial institutions in Latin America may facilitate the generation and 
testing of interesting institution-based explanations. Finally, as analysts have suggested 
(Larkins 1998a, Louza 2002b) and the following analysis reveals, the Argentine and 
Venezuelan judiciaries, and their high courts in particular, have been granted a broad 
rangę of powers. Conseąuently, they hołd tremendous potential to be politically 
consequential should they evolve into more independent institutions whose rulings 
firmly regulate the behavior of those who hołd political power (as well as those who do 
not). We cannot assume that judiciaries in Latin America will evolve in any direction at 
all, let alone that their power will increase. Nonetheless, in the event that the power of 
these judiciaries does increase, it is crucial that we understand how their institutions 
and structures influence the rulings of their high courts on the politically important 
cases that will no doubt continue to come before them.
The infrastructure of justice in Argentina and Venezuela
Judicial reform efforts in Latin America over the past two decades have aimed to 
improve access to the region’s judiciaries, as well as their transparency, accountability, 
efficiency, and independence (Skaar 2001: 1). While experiences differ substantially 
from country to country, the main components common to most reform programs are 
the revision of basie codes (especially the codes and procedures of criminal justice); the 
improvement of training and education of judges; the depoliticization of the system for 
appointing lower and appeals court judges and high court justices; the securing of
a guaranteed budget for the judiciary; the increase in funding allocated to the public 
prosecutor’s office (Ministeńo Publico) and its all-around strengthening; the creation 
of judicial councils; and the creation of a constitutional court or a constitutional 
chamber within the high court (Hammergren 1998: 267; Skaar 2001: 16). Some of 
these reforms were carried out through constitutional revision while others were 
executed through the passage of separate judicial reform legislation.
In generał terms, the judicial reforms that occurred in Argentina during the 
decade of the 1980s emphasized the modemization of criminal and penal laws. 
Subsequent reforms through the 1990s, including the 1994 amendment to the Constitu- 
tion of 18533, and the passage of a variety of legislation relating to the judiciary, often 
replicated reforms that had already occurred in provincial judiciaries. The main reforms 
targeted the inefficiency of the judiciary (including the expansion of public defense 
agencies and the augmentation in the number of administrative clerks), its lack of 
independence (including reforms to the process of choosing judges), and its 
ineffectiveness (including the introduction of changes such as Altemate Dispute 
Resolution mechanisms) (Ungar 2002: 10-11; 145-148)4.
While judicial reform was on the political agenda in Venezuela beginning in 
the mid-1980s , real reform efforts did not get underway until the 1990s. In 1992, 
Venezuela became the first Latin American country in which the World Bank 
established a program devoted solely to judicial reform (the Venezuela Judicial 
Infrastructure Project) (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1996: i), and additional 
World Bank sponsored projects aimed at modemizing the justice sector were 
implemented in the late 1990s. In generał, reform emphasized augmenting the 
accessibility of the judiciary, increasing court discipline, improving govemment 
policies, and strengthening community justice systems (Ungar 2002: 10-11). However, 
as the following analysis reveals, the institutional overhaul that occurred in Venezuela 
beginning in 1999 overshadowed these earlier efforts, and were far more dramatic than 
those that occurred in Argentina during the 1980s and 1990s. In short, through the 
promulgation of the Constitution of 1999 and a diverse array of legislation, President 
Chavez sought to completely revamp Venezuela’s political infrastructure.
All of these reforms are important to improving the performance of justice 
sector institutions in Argentina and Venezuela. However, this paper will focus only 
a narrow sub-set: reforms to the justice sector institutions and rules that may affect 
Supreme Court decision-making in politically and economically important cases. For
3 The 1994 charter is not a “new” constitution: the first article o f the Declaratory Law calling for the for- 
mation of a constitutional assembly to reform the Constitution passed by Congress and promulgated by President 
Menem in December 1993 expressly noted the need to “partially reform” the 1853 charter; the Constitution of 
1994 was not referred to as a “new” constitution in any part of the reform legislation ( F in k e l  2001: 92; H e lm k e  
2000: 190).
4 These reforms were supported by loans from a variety o f intemational financial institutions including 
the Inter-American Development Bank (1993, 1998), the World Bank (1992, 1998, 2002) and the United States 
Agency for Intemational Development (1991). The Inter American Development Bank’s project in Argentina was 
one of the largest judicial reform initiatives planned by an intemational financial institution, and the 1992 World 
Bank project was the first o f such initiatives to be suspended in Latin America (U n g a r  2002: 10-11).
President Jaime Lusinchi’s (1984-1989) Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE), 
created in 1984, considered reform of the judicial sector an important priority.
each, it will offer some very generał thoughts on how the naturę of the institution could 
affect judicial decision-making, and then describe cross-time and cross-national 
variation with regard to that institution6.
Justice sector and judicial institutions
1. Institutional stability: The freąuency with which, and degree to which a country’s 
generał political and judicial structure -  as reflected in its laws and constitutions -  
changes could very well affect both justices’ in-depth knowledge of the statutes and 
constitutional clauses that they are charged with applying, and their investment in 
ensuring that societal actors adhere to those rules. Institutional instability could also 
affect justices’ knowledge of the rules and procedures that are to guide their own 
behavior, and their willingness to abide by those.
Argentina and Venezuela exhibit striking variation with respect to consti­
tutional stability. Argentina has operated under the Constitution of 1853 (to which 
significant reforms were made in 1860 and 1994) sińce that charter’s promulgation 
(with the exception of the period from 1949 to 1956, during which Argentina was 
govemed under Peron’s constitution) (Chavez 2001: 52). On the other end of the 
spectrum, by 1961, Venezuela had been govemed by more written constitutions than 
any other Latin American country; the Constitution of 1999 was Venezuela’s 26lh or 
27th charter, depending upon whether one counts certain versions of the Constitution as 
reforms of existing charters, or completely new constitutions (Komblith 1991, 62-3)7. 
Between 1983 and 2003, as noted above, constitutional change in Venezuela (1999) 
was much more dramatic than that which occurred in Argentina (1994)8. Finally, 
statutory change that went into effect in Venezuela between 1999 and 2003 was more 
profound quantitatively and qualitatively9 than that which occurred between 1983 and
1998 in Venezuela, or between 1983 and 1998, or 1999 and 2003 in Argentina.
2. Federalism: Whether a country has a federal political system10 may have a signifi­
cant effect on high court decision-making on politically important cases in at least two 
ways. First and most obviously, if there is a parallel provincial justice system, 
politically significant cases (that do not deal directly with officers, laws, or decrees of 
the federal govemment, for these would be handled by the federal system) may be 
resolved in that system, meaning that fewer such cases would reach the federal system,
6 The main idea is to encourage and facilitate hypothesis-generation that considers institutional independ­
ent variables.
7 An interesting related ąuestion is whether this instability suggests that the Constitution, and “getting the 
institutions right,” matters less -  or more -  in Venezuela. Scholars such as K o r n b l i th  (1991) and D a re n b lu m  
(2003) advocate the latter interpretation.
8 One analyst suggests that the Constitution o f 1999 introduced such significant change with respect to the 
judiciary because it was the most questioned and inefficient of the branches o f govemment: critics had gone so far 
as to refer to it as “la cinicienta de los poderes" (“the ashtray o f the govemmental branches”) (L ou  za 2002a: 3).
9 Change more often involved writing new or replacement legislation rather than revising existing laws.
10 Federalism is understood here to be a form of government characterized by the division o f power be­
tween central and regional authorities. and most importantly for my purposes, in which each o f a country’s prov- 
inces has a separate judicial system.
and the national Supreme Court. Second, as Martin Shapiro has suggested11, Supreme 
Courts in federal systems may serve the function of keeping provincial goveming 
authorities (executives, legislatures, and judges alike) “in check” -  that is, as Shapiro 
whimsically analogizes, they may serve as the central govemment’s “junk yard dog.” 
Given a high court’s knowledge of the utility of the disciplining service they provide 
for the central govemment, Shapiro reasons, a high court that performs that function 
may feel more at liberty to challenge the central govemment (“bite the junkyard 
owner”) from time to time, gauging that a central govemment so indebted to the Court 
may be less inclined to punish it.
Argentina has been a fully federal system throughout the time period of 
interest. There are 25 “separate judiciaries” in Argentina: the federal judiciary, the 
“national,” “ordinary,” or “common” judiciary of the Federal Capital12, and one 
judiciary for each of the country’s 23 provinces. The provincial system handles most of 
the ordinary litigation (Bergoglio 2003, 27). While most Venezuelan constitutions have 
indicated that Venezuela has a federal system of govemment, the existence of separate 
judicial systems in each of the country’s provinces has varied over time. However, 
sińce 1945, no province has had a separate judiciary, and all of the country’s judges are 
federal judges (Brewer Carias 1985 in Molinelli et al. 1999: fn p. 638).
3. Judicial Branch -  Court Structuren : The degree of centralization, the number of 
“layers” of courts that exist beneath the Supreme Court in the federal judiciary, and the 
existence of a sub-system of administrative courts (and their jurisdiction) could affect 
the number of politically significant cases that arrive to the Supreme Court for 
resolution14.
In Argentina, through the time period of interest, the courts of the federal 
judiciary were organized in three levels: the Supreme Court, federal appeals courts, and 
first instance courts15. A separate sub-system of administrative courts headed by the 
Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso -  Administrativo Federal (a fede­
ral appeals court) handles administrative cases and cases in which charges are made 
against public administrators (Ungar 2002: 122). The Argentine constitutional reforms
11 Presentation, “On Prediction and Comparison in the Study o f Legał Institutions,” May 5, 12: 30-1: 45, 
Seminar Room, University o f Califomia, Berkeley Center for the Study o f Law and Society.
12 While in some senses the judiciary o f the Federal Capital was, through the 1990s, ju st one more provin- 
cial judiciary, in other senses, it operated as an adjunct system to the federal system. For example, until 1999, the 
judges in this judiciary were designated and removed using processes similar to those used in the federal judiciary, 
and their salaries were part o f the national budget. The granting o f autonomy to the City o f  Buenos Aires that 
occurred via the 1994 Constitutional reform has led to the initiation o f a progressive transfer o f jurisdiction from 
this “national judiciary” to the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires ( B e r g o g l io  2003: 27).
13 From 1983 to 2003, the Argentine federal judiciary was one o f three branches o f the central govem- 
ment (the others being the executive and the legislature). Until 1999, the Venezuelan federal govemment also 
consisted o f three branches: the executive, legislative and judicial. However, the Constitution o f 1999 established 
two additional branches o f govemment, the Citizen branch and the electoral branch (Venezuelan Constitution of 
1999, Title V, Chapters IV and V). The federal judiciary, consequently, is now one of five branches o f govemment 
in Venezueia.
14 Although not considered here, the ease with which cases can move through the judicial system (that is, 
the ease with which appeals are requested and granted) could also be an important factor. See H e lm k e  2000 
(269-270), for a discussion of the three types o f appeals that were available in Argentina during the time period 
under study: recurso ordinario, recurso extraordinario, and recurso de queja.
15 In the late 1990s, there were 24 appeals courts and 343 first instance courts (H e lm k e  2000: 267).
of 1994 did not modify either the structure of the federal judiciary or its extremely 
centralized naturę. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 also established a very 
centralized court structure consisting of the Supreme Court, superior (appellate) courts, 
first instance courts, municipal courts (known as district courts or, in the capital district, 
department courts until 1996), and parish courts (known as municipal courts until 
1996)16. The overhaul of the federal judiciary in 1999 changed this overall structure 
very little: the number of courts at the higher levels increased, all existing parish courts 
were renamed juzgados de municipio, and some of these courts, denominated juzgados 
ejecułores de medidas, were charged with enforcing judgments from other courts 
(Perez Perdomo 2003c: 470). The Ley Organica del Poder Judicial (1998) mandated 
that the Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo (High Administrative Court) 
adjudicate cases conceming the govemment and established its status as second to that 
of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice17.
4. Judicial Branch Involvement in Appointment o f Lower Court Judgesis: In countries 
where a judicial career exists, the involvement of judicial branch institutions in the 
appointment of lower court judges may have in important indirect effect on high court 
decision-making: whether the high court itself, a separate judicial branch organ, the 
executive, or the legislature appoints, sanctions, and removes judges at the lower levels 
of the judiciary will have a significant effect on the political and jurisprudential 
leanings of the pool of judges from which high court justices are ultimately drawn19.
Prior to the 1994 reform of the Argentine Constitution, first instance and 
appellate level federal judges were chosen by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate (Finkel 2001: 99)20. That constitutional reform created a Judicial Council as 
a permanent organ of the judicial branch of govemment, with the aim of decreasing the 
discretion of the executive with respect to judicial appointments and dismissals. Since 
then, the Judicial Council has been charged with conducting written exams for posted 
judicial openings on appeals and first instance courts, and nominating judges for
16 The number o f superior and first instance courts also grew substantially prior to 1999 while the number 
of municipal and parish courts stayed relatively stable between 1961 and 1999 ( P e re z  P e r d o m o  2003b: 6).
17 In addition, the 1982 Ley Orgdnica de Salva del Patrimonio Publico established the Tribunal Superior 
de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Publico (TSS), mainly a court of appeal that had original jurisdiction over cases 
involving allegations o f embezzlement and corruption on the part of high-ranking officials. The partisan naturę of 
appointments to the Tribunal, however, resulted in paralyzing political rivalries and conflicts; the court handled 
few cases, while its jurisdiction prevented other courts from hearing cases (U n g a r  2002: 128, P ć re z  P e rd o m o  
2003c: 452; Perez P e r d o m o  2003b: 9).
18 The existence and effectiveness of a Judicial School, charged in those Latin American countries where 
it exists with the training and formation o f  judges, could also be important. No national Judicial School appears to 
exist in Argentina. A Judicial School administered by the Judicial Council was established in Venezuela 1982, 
closed in the mid-1980s, and reopened in 1990 on a limited basis (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1996: 
49). The School underwent reorganization and expanded in the late 1990s, was subseąuently made autonomous 
from the Judicial Council in hopes it could become fmancially solvent (U n g a r  2002: 153), and finally came 
under the direction o f the Supreme Tribunal with the Constitution o f 1999. Most accounts consider the School to 
be ineffective, and note that it has not found a way to distinguish its offerings from those o f university law schools.
19 For example, as Hilbink describes the situation in Chile, judges who aspire to advance in their career 
feel that their rulings must reflect the political and jurisprudential leanings o f the Chilean Supreme Court, leading 
to the reproduction o f conservative jurisprudence throughout the judiciary, and on the high court (1999).
20 W hile a 1992 law introduced public hearings into the judicial nominating procedures, such hearings 
were not consistently held during the 1990s (S m u lo v i tz  1997: 8).
presidential appointment and Senate approval21; the Council is also charged with 
promoting, disciplining, initiating proceedings to investigate alleged misconduct on the 
part of, and removing lower court judges22 (Larkins 1998a: 183-4; Finkel 2001: 99- 
100). The 1994 constitutional reform also called for the creation of a jurado de 
enjuiciamiento, a special nine-member jury to participate in the selection, trial, and 
removal of lower court judges (Chavez 2001: 53-4)23.
Venezuela has moved in the opposite direction to some degree. The 
Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 (Article 217) established a Judicial Council as 
a functionally autonomous body (i.e. separate from each branch of govemment, 
including the judiciary), in hopes of increasing the independence and efficacy of the 
judiciary and guaranteeing the judicial career24. The Council was charged with 
appointing, evaluating, promoting, and disciplining judges (formerly the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Justice) (Louza 2002b: 2)25. The Council’s ineffectiveness (it 
sanctioned few judges, became embroiled in party warfare, and was laced with 
clientelism) led to efforts to reformulate and strengthen it in 1988 and 1998 (with the 
Ley Orgdnica del Consejo de la Judicatura), and finally its abandonment in the 
Constitution of 1999 (Perez Perdomo 2003c: 443-50; Ungar 2002: 174; Louza 2002b: 
21). That Constitution and a flurry of legislation over the next two years mandated 
that entrance into and promotion within the judiciary would occurs via public contests 
before panels of judges (Constitution of 1999, Article 255), and created a variety of 
(often overlapping) bodies involved in the appointment, promotion, discipline and 
removal of lower court judges27. Nonetheless, each of those bodies is either part of, or 
depends upon and answers to, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, to which finał 
responsibility for all appointments falls28.
21 Once confirmed by the Senate, judges have a lifetime term, given continued “good behavior.”
22 The Council consists o f 20 members (which include representatives o f  the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, lawyers, and academics) elected to four-year terms with the possibility o f reelection for one 
additional term ( F in k e l  2001: 100).
23 As is well-documented elsewhere, subsequent wrangling over the composition o f the Council held up 
the enactment o f implementing legislation until December 1997; neither the Judicial Council nor the special jury 
for judges came into existence until November 1998 (U n g a r  2002: 179-180; M o l in e l l i  e ta l. 1999:657).
24 Venezuela’s Judicial Council was the first such organ established in Latin America (H a m m e rg re n  1998: 92).
25 In addition, the Law of Judicial Careers (1980) regulated entrance competitions and established elear 
criteria for evaluating, promoting, and sanctioning judges. However, Venezuela’s “archaic” system of judicial admini- 
stration made the procedures mandated by the statute difficult to implement (P ć re z  P e r d o m o  2003c: 443,450).
26 This included promulgation o f the rigorous Reforma Parciał de la Normas de Evaluación y  Concur- 
sos de Oposición para el lngreso y  Permanencia en el Poder Judicial (March 13, 2000), which regulates public 
contests and evaluation o f judges (L o u z a  2002b).
27 The two most important are the Comisión Judicial del Tribunal Supremo (which comes the closest to 
substituting for the Judicial Council) and its immediate hierarchical inferior the Dirección E jecutim  de la Magis- 
tratura (which aids the Supreme Tribunal in directing, goveming, administering, and inspecting the judiciary); 
both form part o f the Supreme Tribunal (P ć re z  P e rd o m o  2003b: 15).
28 As intimated in the opening paragraph of this sub-section, these rules and institutions are o f greater im- 
portance in countries where a judicial career exists. Argentina and Venezuela also differ on this point. There is 
effectively no judicial career in Argentina (Govemment of Argentina 2002: 23). In Venezuela, the judicial career 
has been regulated by the Constitutions (1961 and 1999) and the Judicial Career Laws (1980 and 1998) from 1983 
to 2003; throughout the period, judgeship has been an administrative career involving progressive ascension 
through the four levels o f  the Venezuelan judiciary; through 1998, judges were required to spend four years at 
each level before ascension and were required to retire after 35 years o f service (Judicial Career Law of 1980, 
Articles 7 and 8). The tremendous judicial reorganization that occurred in 1999 interrupted the flow o f many 
judges’ careers, however.
5. Judicial Branch Budgetary Autonomy29: Whether or not the amount the judiciary is 
allocated from the annual federal budget is fixed, and if it is not, who is involved in the 
process of making decisions regarding the allocation of funds to the judiciary, and who 
Controls the sub-allocation of those funds throughout the federal judiciary are factors 
that could affect high court decision-making. Other things being equal, it seems logical 
that if consistency in allocation is not guaranteed, and if the high court has little 
autonomy over the administration of its budget, the high court is more beholden to the 
govemment that holds and manages its purse strings, and may less often dare to 
challenge that govemment.
The Argentine judiciary does not receive a fixed percent of national budget, 
and its allocations have varied over time30. While the judicial budget has traditionally 
been prepared by the executive, Law 23,853 (the Law of Economic Self-Sufficiency, 
1990) afforded the Supreme Court the power to develop the first draft of the judicial 
budget31, and left at its disposal the regulation, collection, and management of the 
federal judiciary’s assets. The Constitution of 1994 gave the Judicial Council the 
authority to execute the budget and manage the assets of the judiciary (Gershanik 2002: 
25). Similarly, through 1999, the Venezuelan judiciary did not receive a fixed 
percentage of the national budget, and its allocations were typically ąuite smali32. 
However, the 1999 Constitution (Article 254) mandated that the justice system (which 
includes a wide gamut of institutions beyond the federal judiciary, see below) would 
receive no less than two percent of the national budget, and dictated that said 
percentage could be neither reduced nor modified without the authorization of the 
National Assembly. From 1983 through 1999, the Judicial Council and the Supreme 
Court elaborated the judicial budget for subsequent approval by the Venezuelan 
Congress, and the Judicial Council administered the budget for the national judicial 
system (Perez Perdomo 2003b: l)33. Since the promulgation of the Constitution of
1999 (Article 267), the above-mentioned Dirección Ejecutiva de la Magistratura 
elaborates and administers the budget of the judiciary (including the budget of the
19 Points four and five raise the larger issue of the degree to which the Supreme Court is involved in the 
administration o f  the judicial branch o f govemment. This could matter to high court decision-making in a very 
simple way: a high court that is busy executing administrative functions may have less time to resolve court cases. 
In Argentina, the Supreme Court administered the judiciary until the Judicial Council (a judicial branch organ) 
began to do so after its creation in 1998. In Venezuela, the opposite occurred: the autonomous Judicial Council 
administered the judiciary until its abandonment in 1999; beyond that point, the Supreme Court and its various 
administrative and consultative adjuncts have been charged with that duty.
30 The constitutional reform of 1994 did not change this situation. Low and high points o f the contempo- 
rary period are as follows: the judiciary was allocated .79% of the national budget in 1984, and 3.8% in 1990; the 
judicial budget declined from 1992 through the end of the century (U n g a r  2002: 150).
31 According to Ungar, this reform was inconsequential, as throughout the 1990s the executive continually low- 
ered the budgetary figurę proposed by the Supreme Court, a revision that Congress did not question (2002: 150).
32 The percentage o f the national budget the judiciary received varied between 0.5% and 1% between 
1961 and 1998, with an average o f 5% from 1971 to 1993. The percentage increased significantly from 1998 to 
2001, then fell in 2002 ( P ć re z  P e r d o m o  2003b: 18).
33 The Treasury, however, which actually dispersed the funds, exercised considerable discretion (P e re z  
P e rd o m o  2003b: 4).
Supreme Tribunal), although that budget must still be approved by the National 
Assembly34.
6. Existence and Role o f Extra-Judicial Branch Justice Sector Institutions: The 
existence of four specific types of extra-judicial justice sector institutions, and their 
degree of independence from the popularly elected branches of govemment, might 
affect the types of cases that come before the Supreme Court: the Ombudsman’s office, 
the General Comptroller’s office, the National Public Prosecutor’s office, and the 
National Public Defender’s office. The effectiveness of the Ombudsman’s office and of 
the General Comptroller’s office can influence the number of cases that have the 
potential to come up through the court system. The efficacy of the National Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and the National Public Defender’s office, and the effectiveness 
with which the National Public Prosecutor and National Public Defender argue their 
cases before the high court may have a direct effect high court decisions.
These four institutions have undergone important change in Argentina in the 
1990s. The National Ombudsman’s office was first created by Congress in July 1993 
(Law 24.284), and acąuired constitutional status (Article 86) in 1994 as an independent 
organ in the congressional realm, charged with defending and protecting the 
constitutional and legał rights and guarantees of the citizenry against acts and 
omissions of the administration. The General Comptroller’s office, part of the 
legislative branch, is charged with the extemal control of the national public sector in 
its patrimonial, economic, financial and operational aspects (Constitution of 1994, 
Article 85). While the Public Prosecutor’s office has long existed, the 1853 
Constitution had no clause for it, which generated substantial confusion in doctrine, 
legał norms, and jurisprudence (Iaryczower et al. 2000: 14). With the constitutional 
reform of 1994, the office gained constitutional status as a bicephalous independent 
body including the National Attomey General’s Office (which prosecutes criminal, 
civil, and commercial offenses on behalf of the State) (Ungar 2002: 18), and the newly 
formed National Public Defender’s Office (which directs and coordinates the work of 
all the public defenders and acts in defense of legality and the generał interests of 
society) (Gershanik 2002: 20); the 1998 Ley Organica del Ministerio Publico further 
strengthened the agency (Ungar 2002: 46).
In Venezuela, there was no Ombudsman’s Office until the 1999 Constitution 
created it in the Citizen branch of govemment35, and charged it with receiving and 
investigating complaints of the State’s violation of constitutional rights (Perez Perdomo 
2003c: 469). The Comptroller’s office, before 1999 considered an auxiliary organ of 
Congress, and after that year’s constitutional reform an organ of the Citizen branch, has 
played an increasingly important role in the control of the govemment and corruption 
(Perez Perdomo 2003b: 1). The 1961 Constitution made the National Public
34 On a more micro-level, the degree to which justices’ salaries are protected might influence their will- 
ingness to challenge those who write their paycheck. In Argentina, Article 96 o f the 1853 Constitution (and Article 
110 of the 1994 reform of that constitution) indicates that justices’ salaries cannot be reduced while the justices 
continue to sit on the Supreme Court. There appear to be no similar guarantees regarding Venezuelan high court 
justices’ salaries.
35 See footnote 13 for an explanation o f the five branches o f govemment in Venezuela under the 1999 
Constitution.
Prosecutor’s office independent from the other organs of state and empowered it to 
oversee the state’s rights and obligations (it functioned as both prosecutor and ombuds­
man until the 1999 constitutional reform); the 1999 reform reestablished the office in 
the Citizen branch of govemment and further empowered it with respect to its 
prosecuting duties. The Office of the Public Defender has also long existed in Venezu- 
ela as part of the Executive Branch, though its operation has been impeded by poor 
funding and a lack of cooperation from other govemmental entities (Ungar 2002; 55).
7. Jurisdiction o f  Military Courts: If we assume that judicial jurisdiction and judicial 
power are zero-sum, the greater the jurisdiction of military courts and the more power 
they wield, the smaller the jurisdiction of civilian courts (including the high court) and 
the less power they enjoy. The power military courts wield has been an important issue 
in Latin America given the region’s history of military intervention in politics. Further, 
while both Argentina and Venezuela were democracies during the entire time period 
under study, military uprisings have not been unknown: Argentina experienced a (brief 
and unsuccessful) military rebellion in early December 1990, Venezue!a witnessed two 
unsuccessful coup attempts in 199236, and in April 2002, President Chavez was 
removed from office in a successful coup led by a coalition of military and business 
leaders (though he regained power within days).
The situation in Argentina and Venezuela with respect to the jurisdiction and 
strength of military courts exhibits interesting variation. In Argentina, unlike the 
situation in other Southern Cone countries that recently transitioned from authoritarian 
rule, democratization resulted in the drastic curtailment of military justice: citizens 
were excluded from the jurisdiction of military courts during peacetime, military courts 
were subjected to rigorous civilian review37, and cases involving the commission of 
nonmilitary crimes by military and police personnel were moved to the jurisdiction of 
civilian courts (Pereira 2001: 557). In Venezuela, by contrast, military courts have been 
inereasing their jurisdiction sińce the early 1980s (Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights 1996: 47). Further, the Venezuelan civilian and military court systems’ 
jurisdiction over cases are intertwined, and at least until 1999, the Venezuelan high 
court was empowered to choose between the two systems when it was unclear in which 
system’s jurisdiction a certain case fell (Ungar 2002: 128).
The Supreme Court
8. Structure and Size38: The organization and size of the high court could affect its 
propensity to issue decisions that challenge the sitting govemment. The justices that
36 As is well known, the first o f those coup attempts was led by current President Chavez.
37 Specifically, all cases within the jurisdiction o f military courts could be appealed to civilian courts, 
which could also assume jurisdiction o f military cases if they considered military courts to be excessively slow in 
handing down rulings ( P e r e i r a  2001: 557).
38 While this point is not analyzed here, given the important role that the leaders o f high courts often play, 
it may be useful to examine how those leaders are chosen. In Argentina, the Justices o f the Supreme Court elect 
the President, who serves a three-year term. In Venezuela, intemal contests elect the Junta Direcliva, composed of 
a President, Vicepresident, and Second Vicepresident, all of whom must be members o f different chambers 
(L o u z a  2002b: 7-8).
populate the different chambers of larger high courts that are organized into chambers, 
for instance, may eventually become more familiar with the laws, constitutional 
provisions, and existing jurisprudence in the subject matter with which their particular 
chamber is charged; this may lead those justices to feel that they are standing on firmer 
legał ground, and thus in a stronger position to challenge to the powers-that-be. On the 
other hand, the number of judges that sit on smaller courts generally exceeds the 
number of judges that constitute a chamber in larger ones; to the degree that there is 
power in numbers, courts that handle crucial political ąuestions en pleno may be more 
willing to hand down rulings that challenge the interests of the sitting govemment.
The Argentine Supreme Court has consisted of a single chamber through the 
time period under study. With respect to the number of justices (which is regulated by 
legislation rather than the Constitution, facilitating its modification), there has been 
greater instability. As has been well-documented elsewhere39, on April 5, 1990, at the 
behest of Argentine President Menem, the lower house of the Argentine Congress40 
passed the Ley de Ampliación (Law of Expansion), which increased the size of the 
Argentine Supreme Court from five to nine justices (Finkel 2001, 81). The Venezuela 
Constitution of 1961 and the Ley Organica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (1976) 
created one high court41, the Supreme Court of Justice, divided into three autonomous 
chambers (the Sala PoUtico-Administrativa, the Sala de Casación Civil, Mercantil y 
del Trabajo, and the Sala de Casación Penat) each including five justices. The 
Constitution of 1999 (Article 262) and a decree issued by the National Constituent 
Assembly in 1999 created the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and modified the high 
court’s structure, dictating that it would function in six chambers (Constitucional, 
Politico Administrativa, Electoral, de Casación Civil, de Casación Penal, and de 
Casación Social) each with three justices (with the exception of the constitutional 
chamber which would include five justices), for a total of 20 justices42.
9. Jurisdiction13: It seems logical to assume that the greater the jurisdiction a high court 
enjoys, the more cases it has the potential to hear, the more cases it decides, and the 
greater the number of opportunities it thus has to challenge the sitting govemment. 
Nonetheless, broad jurisdiction can also generate possibilities for the Court to delay 
(perhaps indefinitely) dealing with the most politically salient controversies to come 
before it44.
M S e e C h a v e z  2001: F in k e l  2001; H e lm k e  2 0 0 0 ;L a rk in s  1998 and U n g a r  2002.
40 The Senate had approved the bill in September 1989.
41 The 1961 Constitution effected the fusion of the two previously existing high courts, the Federal Court 
and the Court o f Cassation. In Venezuela, as in Argentina, the number o f justices on the high court is regulated by 
legislation rather than the Constitution.
42 In 2002 and 2003, in discussions in the National Assembly regarding the forthcoming Ley del Tribunal 
Suprenu) de Justicia (which would replace the Ley de la Corte Suprema de Justicia o f  1977), legislators have 
considered expanding the Supreme Tribunal o f Justice to 30 justices (Economist, Nov. 20, 2003).
43 Note that administrative jurisdiction was handled very briefly in footnote 39 above; this sub-section 
deals only with jurisdiction in terms of which cases the high court is empowered to consider.
44 An important facet o f  jurisdiction not fully considered here is whether the high court is also a court of 
cassation charged with rationalizing legał interpretation throughout the judicial system by reviewing how lower 
courts apply the law to the cases that they adjudicate (C o u so  2002: 337); while the Argentine high court was not 
formally denominated a court of cassation across the time period under study, the Venezuelan Supreme Court was 
established as a court o f cassation in 1961, and the Supreme Tribunal o f Justice created in 1999 retained that 
power.
The Argentine Supreme Court has ordinary jurisdiction over all federal 
matters. Specifically, it has appellate jurisdiction over cases involving issues regulated 
by the Constitution and the laws of the nation; involving treaties with foreign nations; 
involving maritime law; in which the Nation is a party; and in which a foreign country 
or citizen is the defendant. It has original jurisdiction over a more limited set of cases: 
those conceming ambassadors, ministers, foreign consuls, and cases in which a provin- 
ce is a party (Constitution of 1853, Articles 100 and 101; 1994 reform, Articles 115 
and 116). The Court has extraordinary jurisdiction over any sort of case in which the 
interpretation of a federal norm is at stake, or a contradiction is alleged between the 
Constitution and another act or norm at any level (Helmke 2000: 21; Molinelli et al. 
1999,639-650)45.
The Venezuelan Supreme Court and Supreme Tribunal of Justice have both 
been charged with hearing a wide gamut of cases; the rangę of cases that come before 
them may be even wider than that which comes before the Argentine Supreme Court 
considering that the provincial judicial system in Argentina may act as a filter. For this 
analysis, one of the two most important chambers of the Venezuelan high court is the 
Politico Administrativa chamber (which existed both before and after the 1999 
restructuring of the Court)46, it has the power to annul illegal administrative acts; order 
the payment of monetary sums and the reparation of harm and danger caused by the 
govemment; and hear claims regarding the provision of public services (Constitution of 
1999, Art. 259,266).
10. Docket Control and Case Load: Whether or not a high court has control over the 
cases that it hears might affect its decision-making regarding politically salient cases in 
two ways. First, a high court that can choose the cases it hears has a greater ability to 
“grab” or “duck” such cases at will. Second, Courts that are unable to filter cases and 
must hear all those that come before them may end up hearing an extraordinary 
number of cases, the possible effects of which were discussed in the first paragraph of 
point nine above.
The Argentine Supreme Court has traditionally been unable to control its 
docket. While several changes have occurred during the time period under study to 
afford the court the power to hear more cases47, the Supreme Court still lacks the 
power to issue certiorari decisions -  it must hear those cases that come before it 
(Iaryczower et al. 2000: 4). Similarly, neither the Venezuelan Supreme Court nor the 
Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice has had the ability to choose which cases it 
will hear; the jurisdiction of each chamber, practically all-encompassing in combi- 
nation, is defined in the constitution and the Ley Organica de la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia. Perhaps partially as a result of this lack of docket control, an extraordinary 
number of cases have entered and been decided annually by these two high courts 
during the period under study.
45 The jurisdiction and fiinctioning of the court with respect to constitutional matters will be reviewed below.
46 The other is the constitutional chamber; its powers are reviewed in detail below.
47 The procedural code was modified to afford the Court extraordinary jurisdiction in 1990 (H e lm k e  
2000: 173; see “Jurisdiction” above), and the Court appeared to adopt the norm of per saltum  in its July 1990 
Aerolineas Argentinas ruling (H e lm k e  2000).
11. Intemal Organization and Case Review Procedures: How cases move through the 
high court, which high court personnel contribute to the opinion that is written on them 
and in which order they do so, and other features of the court’s intemal organization 
can exert considerable influence on the rulings that it eventually hands down. For 
instance, some agenda-setting and decision-making rules and norms might generate 
more opportunities for coordination, bargaining, and log-rolling among justices than 
others (Helmke 2000)48.
In Argentina, each case arrives in one of the eight offices of the Judicial 
Secretariat (Secretańa Judicial), each of which deals with a different branch of law. 
That office drafts an opinion and sends the case to the office of a justice (which 
includes the justice’s own Secretarios [the equivalent of appeals court judges] and 
Prosecretarios Letrados [the equivalent of first instance judges]. That justice’s office 
writes another draft of the opinion, and the case and that opinion then proceeds into 
circulation for seąuential consideration according to a written schedule established by 
the President of the Court. Each justice reviews the case and the opinion to determine 
whether he wishes to sign the opinion, amend it, concur separately, or include a dissent 
with the draft opinion. The Court President mles last and determines whether the 
Attomey General should also write an opinion. Justices meet in weekly or bi-weekly 
sessions to discuss and sign opinions on cases that all the justices have already 
reviewed; drafts and finał opinions are anonymous (Helmke 2000: 99,204,273-275).
In Venezuela, each chamber of the high court includes, among other 
personnel, justices, substitute judges (Suplentes and Conjueces)*9, Secretarios de Salas 
(elected functionaries who guide the cases through the chamber and write sentences 
with the magistrates), and Aguaciles (elected police functionaries who maintain the 
intemal order of the chamber). With respect to decision-making, one justice (a ponente 
assigned by the president whose identity, in contrast to the Argentinian system, is 
known by all the justices in the chamber) drafts the original opinion. Also in contrast 
with the Argentine system, the members of the relevant chamber (or the Court as 
a whole, if the case is of the type considered en pleno) sit together to express their 
agreement or disagreement with the draft opinion and to decide the case (Louza 2002b: 
6- 10)50.
48 As H e lm k e  (2000) quite rightly points out, the intemal organization and practices o f high courts, at 
least in the U.S. political science literature on Latin America, are unexplored terrain that is ripe for theoretical 
development.
49 Substitute judges fili in for high court justices when the latter are absent. “Suplentes" are appointed at 
the same time as justices and must have the same qualifications; “Conjueces"  for whom the requirements are also 
the same, are designated annually by each chamber (Ley Organica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia  art. 16, 17, 67; 
L o u z a  2002b: 7). Substitute justices are also allowed in Argentina.
50 If the original draft is not approved by the absolute majority o f the justices sitting to decide the case, 
another ponente is appointed to write a second draft. In addition, the high court in Venezuela has become increas­
ingly technologically advanced: while traditionally every piece o f information regarding every case was included 
in a paper “file” (P ć re z  P e rd o m o  2003b: 5), sińce 1999, several courts including the Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice have begun to utilize a Computer system to automate and increase the randomness o f  the distribution of 
cases, in hopes o f improving the efficiency and augmenting the transparency of the process (L o u z a ,  “Justicia y 
Transparencia,” 3).
The Justices of the Supreme Court
12. Quałifications to be a Justice: It stands to reason that the more rigorous the 
requirements to be a Supreme Court justice and the more closely those reąuirements 
are adhered to, the better jurists will be appointed to the Court. Strong abilities as a ju- 
rist may not necessarily be tightly associated with willingness and ability to challenge 
the sitting govemment, or with immunity to pressure from the political powers that be. 
Nonetheless, it could be that justices with greater jurisprudential knowledge who feel 
that they are on firmer legał ground when they challenge elected authorities may be 
more disposed to do so.
In Argentina, in order to be named a Supreme Court justice, one must have 
been an Argentinian Citizen for at least six years, hołd a degree in law from a national 
university, have practiced law for at least eight years, and be at least 30 years of age 
(Gershanik 2002: 23). The 1961 Venezuelan Constitution indicated that in order to be 
a Supreme Court justice, one must be a Venezuelan citizen by birth, a lawyer, and at 
least 30 years old (Article 213); the Ley Organica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 
added the following reąuirements: to be a person of recognized honor and competence, 
to be in possession of one’s senses and faculties, to have been active in the profession, 
and to have been a practicing lawyer or to have taught law in a public or private 
institution for more than ten years (Article 5). Since 1999, in order to sit on the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, one was reąuired to have Venezuelan 
nationality by birth and possess no other nationality; to be a citizen of recognized 
honor; to be a jurist of recognized competence; and to have been a lawyer for at least 
15 years and hołd a graduate degree in law, or to have been a university professor of 
legał science during at least 15 years and hołd the title of profesor titular, or to be or 
have been a superior judge in the specialty corresponding to that of the open position 
with at least a 15-year judicial career and recognized prestige in the execution of ones 
functions (Constitution of 1999, Article 263). In addition, the reąuirements stipulated 
by the Ley Organica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia continue to apply.
13. Appointment o f Justices: The appointment process has the potential to affect how 
high court justices rule on politically significant cases in at least two different ways. It 
is generally one or both of the popularly elected branches of govemment that appoint 
high court justices; to the degree that those appointments are partisan, lower court 
judges who hope to be chosen may harmonize their decisions with the political 
leanings of those doing the appointing. If justices wish to maintain jurisprudential 
consistency, and if tenure uncertainty exists on the Court (because politicians have 
a history of removing justices or packing the Court for political purposes), newly- 
appointed justices may choose, at least initially, to synchronize their political and 
jurisprudential views with those of their appointers.
In Argentina, until the 1994 reform of the Constitution of 1853, Supreme 
Court appointments were made by the President and approved by the Senate; approval 
reąuired a positive vote by the majority of Senators present at the time of the vote (with 
ąuorum) (Molinelli 2000: 656). The 1994 reform to the Constitution changed the 
process somewhat: thereafter, presidential appointments had to be approved by two-
thirds of the Senators present at the time of the vote (with quorum) (Article 99)51. 
While the Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 mandated that the National Congress 
elected the justices of the Supreme Court52, the appointment process changed 
drastically with the Constitution of 199953. According to that charter, candidates for 
high court justice would apply to a “Judicial Application Committee” (Comite de 
Postulaciones Judicialeś) comprising representatives of different societal sectors 
which, upon hearing the opinion of the community, would nominate one of the 
applicants for the position, and present that nomination to the newly formed Citizen 
branch of govemment. That branch would then execute a second nomination, and 
present it to the National Assembly, which would make the definitive appointment 
(Article 264).
14. Length o f Tenure o f Justices'. While it is likely that the different tenure 
arrangements that characterize high courts have an important influence on high court 
decision-making, it is not immediately obvious what that effect might be. One might 
assume that justices with guaranteed life tenure would feel empowered to follow their 
own political and jurisprudential leanings given the generał difficulty of impeaching 
justices, and given their potential to make a mark on national jurisprudence in view of 
the length of their tenure. However, the freąuency with which extra-institutional 
appointments and dismissals of justices are made in Latin America might weaken that 
assumption. For justices guaranteed a shorter term, the interesting variable becomes 
whether reelection is permitted or not. If it is not, justices may feel empowered to 
challenge the govemment: they “lose less” if impeached given the relatively short 
period for which their appointment is guaranteed. If reelection is permissible, on the 
other hand, justices might restrain themselves from too often, or too severely, 
challenging govemment authorities in hopes of winning re-appointment.
In Argentina, both the Constitution of 1853 and its 1994 reform established 
life terms for Supreme Court Justices. However, Article 99 of the 1994 reform (which 
came into effect in August of 1999) reąuired the appointment of justices who reached 
the age of 75 to be reconsidered and reissued by the Senate every five years (though 
a subsequent high court case challenged that provision)54. In Venezuela, until 1999, 
Supreme Court justices were elected to nine-year terms with possible reelection (with 
five justices, or one third of the Court, being replaced every three years) (Ley Organica 
de la Corte Suprema, Article 214). The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 (Article 264), 
however, mandated that justices would be elected to a twelve-year term without the 
possibility of reelection.
15. Removal o f Justices: The more easily justices can be removed, and the greater the 
involvement of the elected branches of govemment in the removal process, the more
31 One interpretation suggests that the goal o f  this reform was to increase the likelihood that futurę presi- 
dents would propose more centrist judges by increasing the likelihood that ratification would require the nomina­
tion to be supported by more than one party.
32 Scholar o f the Venezuelan judiciary Rogelio P e r e z  P e rd o m o  emphasizes these appointments were 
traditionally strongly partisan (2003c: 424).
33 A temporary process not elaborated here regulated the mode o f  selection and appointment o f Supreme 
justices during the first period o f the 1999 Constitution (L o u z a  2002b: 4-5).
34 There has been much more instability with respect to appointments and tenure on the Argentine Su­
preme Court than one would assume would occur given this constitutional guarantee.
reluctant justices might be to challenge the sitting govemment. Nonetheless, given that 
justice removal in Latin America is not always restrained by the existing institutional 
framework, that framework might have relatively less effect on justices’ calculations 
regarding how they vote on cases.
The Argentine Constitution of 1853, and its 1994 reform, mandated that 
impeachment of a Supreme Court justice reąuired a vote of two thirds of the members 
present in the Chamber of Deputies at the time of the vote (Article 45/Article 53), and 
that removal from office of a Supreme Court justice (already impeached by the 
Chamber) reąuired a vote of two-thirds of the members present in the Senate at the 
time of the vote (Article 51/59)55. In Venezuela prior to 1999, the Supreme Court was 
empowered to decide whether accusations against a justice merited a trial, and if so, to 
pass the case on to the relevant tribunal (in the case of common crimes), or continue 
hearing the case until arriving at a verdict (in the case of political crimes) (Constitution 
1961, Article 215). Since 1999, the Citizen branch hears accusations against high court 
justices. If the allegations are sufficiently serious, the case passes to the National 
Assembly, which can remove justices if two thirds of its members vote to do so 
(Constitution of 1999, Article 265).
16. Continuity with Respect to Supreme Court Justices: This institutional feature, 
which is a reflection of empirical reality rather than a formal law or rule, may have an 
important effect on Supreme Court decision-making. For instance, it seems logical to 
assume that the more insecurity justices experience, the less willing they may be to 
challenge the interests of the central govemment56.
Two of the most dramatic periods of “justice upheaval” on the Argentine 
Court between 1983 and 2003 have been discussed in detail elsewhere57. The 1990 
expansion of the Argentine Supreme Court discussed above created four new Supreme 
Court Justice positions for the Menem administration to fili; however, due to the 
resignation of one sitting justice prior to, and another in response to, the passage of the 
expansion law, Menem would appoint six justices (a fuli two-thirds of the expanded 
Court) within 11 months of assuming the presidency. Next, as part of the political 
bargain struck in order to facilitate the 1994 constitutional reform, three Menem 
appointees resigned between February 1994 and December 1995. Change of almost 
eąual significance was occurred between 2003 and 2004. In early June 2003, 
approximately one month after assuming the Argentine presidency, Nestor Kirchner 
called on Congress to reinstate impeachment proceedings against the Supreme Court. 
One justice resigned shortly thereafter, another resigned soon after the opening of the 
impeachment process against him, and a third was dismissed by the Argentine Senate 
in early December 2003. By March 2004, Kirchner appointed one justice (Terra 
noticias, 26 de diciembre, 2003) and nominated jurists for the two other vacancies58. 
While there was relatively little extra-institutional appointment and removal of high
55 From 1983 until the events o f the second half of 2003 (detailed in point sixteen below), no Argentine 
Supreme Court justice had been accused, let alone impeached.
56 Note that H e lm k e  (2000, 2002) has argued that, under certain conditions, the opposite is the case.
57 See again C h a v e z  2 0 0 1 ;F in k e l  2001; H e lm k e  2 0 0 0 ;L a rk in s  1998 and U n g a r  2002.
58 While Kirchner appeared to be following constitutionally mandated rules for judicial impeachment and 
dismissal, his motives and methods are questioned by many Argentines.
court justices in Venezuela from 1983 to 1999, a great deal of instability resulted from 
the judicial reform initiated by the Constituent Assembly in 1999. The Commission for 
Judicial Emergency dismissed all 15 sitting Supreme Court justices during the Fali of 
1999, and in December 1999, the National Assembly appointed 20 provisional justices 
(selecting esteemed jurists a majority of whom were sympathizers of Chavez) (Perez 
Perdomo 2003: 469). By June 2000, the National Assembly had designated the 20 
permanent magistrates (Louza, 2002b).
The Supreme Court’s Powers of Constitutional Review59
The five aspects of constitutional review included in this section will be considered 
together, as the potential influence each might wield on high court decision-making are 
more or less parallel. The longer a high court has, in effect, held the power of judicial 
review, the broader that power, and the greater the number of parties and courts 
authorized to challenge the constitutionality of govemment acts, laws and decrees, the 
greater the constitutional control the high courts ultimately exerts, the more likely 
constitutional cases are to arrive to it, and the more opportunity that Court has to 
challenge the interests of the sitting govemment.
17. History o f Constitutional Review: Argentina did not create a constitutional court at 
any point in its history, and neither the 1853 Constitution nor its 1994 reform explicitly 
empowers the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review (Chavez 2001: 81). 
Nonetheless, through its own jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has adopted and 
developed the power of judicial review based upon Article 31 of the Constitution of 
1853 (and its 1994 reform), which establishes the supremacy of the Constitution, and 
Article 100 (Article 116 of the 1994 reform of the Constitution), which establishes the 
jurisdiction of all courts to deal with all the points regulated by the Constitution 
(Helmke 2000: 109; Nino 1993: 316). Legislation through the 1860s made the power 
more explicit60, and during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court handed 
down several key rulings that demonstrated its ability to exercise constitutional 
review61. From 1903 to 1929, the Court further expanded its power of judicial review 
(Helmke 2000: 109). Similar to Argentina, a Constitutional Court has never existed in 
Venezuela. However, at least sińce the Constitution of 1830, all Venezuelan 
constitutions have conferred to the Venezuelan high court increasingly broad powers of 
constitutional review.
18. Breadth o f Constitutional Review\ As noted above, the extent of the Argentine 
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review during the time period under study is not
39 The structure of the comparison in this sub-section is inspired by G in s b u r g  2002.
60 Law 20  (1862) mandated that ensuring that the branches o f the central govemment abided by the Con­
stitution was a duty o f the judiciary (C h a v e z  2001: 81), and Law 48  (1863) recognized and regulated the Su­
preme Court’s ability to evaluate the constitutionality o f laws and decrees, although the constitutionality of that 
very law has been questioned (N in o  1993: 333).
61 The Court declared the unconstitutionality o f a presidential decree in 1863 in Rios ( l a r y c z o w e r  et al. 
2000: 5), and in 1887 in Sojo (frequently referred to as the Argentine equivalent o f the U.S. case Marbury v. 
Madison, 1803) the Supreme Court dealt with the constitutionality of a federal legislative enactment (N in o  1993: 316).
madę explicit in the Constitution, and is not elear from the relevant statutes. 
Nonetheless, it is elear that any judge in Argentina can refuse to apply statutes deemed 
unconstitutional to particular claimants, and no judge in the country can annul 
unconstitutional statutes (Chavez 2001: 82)62. The Supreme Court’s use of the power 
of judicial review has been relatively restrained over the last decade and a half (Helmke 
2000: 21; Nino 1993: 317). In Venezuela on the other hand, the high court’s broad 
power to exercise constitutional review over the last fifteen years has been clearly 
constitutionally mandated. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 (Articles 211 and 
215) and the Constitution of 1999 (Articles 266 and 336) empowered the high court to 
determine the constitutionality of all national, state and municipal laws (and all acts of 
equal legał standing), state constitutions, and executive administrative regulations, 
decrees and acts63. In addition, both constitutions empowered the Court to partially or 
totally annul legislation (at all levels of govemment) and regulations deemed 
unconstitutional, and reverse executive and administrative acts that violated the 
constitution or other laws. The Constitution of 1999 offered the Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice even greater constitutional control exercised through the newly created 
constitutional chamber64.
19. Abstract Constitutional Review\ The Argentine Supreme Court cannot exercise 
abstract review: neither the Constitution of 1853 nor its 1994 reform empowered 
justices to ąuestion the constitutionality of bills before they become laws (Chavez 
2001: 82; Helmke 2000: 268). Both the 1961 and 1999 Venezuelan Constitutions 
(Articles 173 and 214 respectively) afford the high court the power of decide the 
constitutionality of laws prior to their promulgation when asked to do so by the 
president.
20. Standing -  Who Can Challenge the Constitutionality o f a Law: In Argentina, only 
those affected by alleged unconstitutional acts have the standing to challenge their 
constitutionality (Chavez 2001: 82). In Venezuela, however, any person can reąuest 
that the constitutionality of a public act (including laws) be reviewed65.
21. Diffuse Control o f Constitutionality: Diffuse control of constitutionality may be an 
important factor affecting high court decision-making on political ąuestions due to the 
potential it creates for lower court judges to highlight for the high court the unconsti- 
tutionality of certain laws and decrees. In Argentina throughout the time period under 
study, formal rules established a decentralized system of judicial review in which every 
court in the federal judieiary was empowered to rule on the constitutionality of laws
62 While the stare decisis doctrine does not exist in Argentina formally, jurispradence often behaves as if 
it did given that, theoretically, if  lower courts fail to apply the jurispradence o f the Supreme Court, the affected 
party can continually appeal their case until they reach the Supreme Court, which can then revoke the lower court 
rulings ( l a r y c z o w e r  et al. 2000: 4)
63 Any such declarations were and are binding, that is, they had and have effects for all courts and all 
cases; lower courts attempted and attempt to follow the doctrine so established by the Supreme Court (G ó m e z , 
Constitution o f 1999, Article 335).
64 According to the Constitution of 1999, these new duties include but are not limited to determining the 
constitutionality o f the “organie” o f laws thus characterized by the National Assembly before their promulgation 
(Articles 203 and 215); declaring unconstitutional legislative failure (at any level) to dictate the norms necessary to 
assure and guarantee the execution o f the Constitution (Article 336); and reviewing the constitutionality o f decrees 
issued by the president during states o f exception (Article 339).
651 thank Manuel Gómez for explaining this.
and decrees and declare them inapplicable to the case at hand (Chavez 2001: 82; 
Helmke 2000: 268). Similarly, from 1983 and 2003 in Venezuela, every judge could 
declare a law unconstitutional and thus inapplicable to the case being considered66.
Conclusion
Over the past 20 years, three simultaneous processes have combined to expand the 
number of disputes potentially subject to legał adjudication, and the potential of judi- 
ciaries to resolve them, in Latin America, Central and Eastem Europę, and other parts 
of the developing world: transitions to democracy, the tum to neoliberal economic 
policies, and widespread judicial reform. As a result, a panoply of politically and 
economically important conflicts are currently being played out in high courts around 
the world. It is conseąuently crucial that we understand why these courts decide cases 
as they do. This paper has argued for an approach that seeks to determine how the 
formal rules and institutions of the justice sector affect high court decision-making in 
developing democracies. As suggested above, given the large gap that often exists 
between formal rules and institutions and actual behavior in many new democracies, 
judicial institutions alone cannot explain judicial decision-making. Nonetheless, these 
institutions are an important part of the causal puzzle that we have been remiss in not 
considering more rigorously.
Understanding high court decision-making on politically and economically 
important cases is a crucial undertaking given the broader consequences that high court 
decisions on such cases may have for political stability and economic development in 
young democracies. As scholars have argued, the greatest threat to democracy in parts 
of the developing world may not be authoritarian regression, but rather a slow 
“hollowing out” of democracy, entailing the gradual erosion of the freedoms, 
guarantees, and processes that are vital to that political system ( 0 ’Donnell 2001, et al.). 
Courts may be able to slow this decay. For instance, by ruling against the state in cases 
in which it is demonstrated that an elected agent of the central govemment acted 
illegally or unconstitutionally (or promulgated unconstitutional laws or policies), and 
by assisting minorities advancing cases on the basis of civil or political rights, courts 
have the opportunity to increase the stability and augment the ąuality of constitutional 
democracy in newly transitioned polities67.
Perhaps less obvious are the pemicious effects that high court decision- 
making, and the cycle of reactions it has the potential to ignite, might engender68. By 
shirking their duties through refusing to take on politically sensitive cases, by ruling for 
the state in cases in which an agent of the state has clearly acted illegally or unconsti-
66 G ó m e z , Constitution o f 1999, Article 334.
67 Some empirical analysis suggests that some Latin American courts do realize this potential: scholar of 
the Chilean Supreme Court Couso suggests that the opportunity to file writs alleging the unconstitutionality of 
laws has become an important method for placing new issues on the political agenda in Chile (2002: 287).
68 Indeed, another hypothesis, which could be tested through lagged time-series analysis, posits an an- 
tagonistic cycle: high court challenges to the central govemment lead to elected authority defiance or manipula- 
tion, which in tum leads to further high court challenges, or, altematively, high court capitulation.
tutionally, or by engaging in behavior that results in retaliatory executive action, high 
courts can damage the legitimacy of the judieiary, thereby diminishing their ability to 
compel legał and constitutional behavior. Further, by making rulings that place 
demands on the state that it cannot possibly fulfill, or that it could only fulfill at the cost 
of endangering economic and political stability69, high courts force central govemment 
authorities to make a difficult choice: act illegally, or act irresponsibly. Either option 
has negative implications for democracy and economic development.
In short, while high courts have the potential to have both a positive and 
negative impact on legality, regime stability, and economic development in young 
democracies, what sort of impact high courts do have is an open, empirical ąuestion. 
By studying high court decision-making, we can begin to address this crucial issue.
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